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Abstract 
 
A case study of an availability analysis for a small commercial 
company is presented. The analysis was carried out to meet a customer 
requirement for the availability of an electronic ground based system 
in a benign environment. Availability calculations were based on 
failure data provided and an explanation of the methodology and 
problems encountered and dealt with are discussed. The methodology 
includes failure classification according to MIL-HDBK-781A and how it 
may be used to promote and develop internal processes. A commentary 
on the background to reliability/availability specification is 
provided and a number of recommendations for monitoring reliability 
and availability are given. 
 
 
Background 
 
Reliability requirements are typically specified in customer 
documentation for products which need to be reliable and safe (e.g. 
aerospace systems, nuclear facilities). The requirements are met by 
the supplier (usually a large manufacturing organisation) by a 
variety of well established reliability methods (e.g. Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Reliability 
testing). The techniques are usually very costly and resource 
intensive and so only large companies have the facilities to carry 
them out. The tools and techniques are well established within 
standards for the military, aerospace and nuclear sectors and these 
large suppliers can afford to carry out quite complex reliability 
analyses (Pate-Cornell and Fischbeck (1993) for an example of a 
probabilistic risk analysis, Pages and Gondran (1986) for examples of 
FMEA and FTA). However, SMEs do not have the resources to carry out 
such complex analyses. The aim of this paper is to show how an 
availability analysis was carried out on a product developed by an 
SME using simple statistical techniques. The approach can be applied 
to any SME that manufactures redundant systems as long as they have a 
data collection system for reliability data as part of their in-house 
quality management systems.  
 
The small company (the supplier) in this case study manufactures 
ground benign electronic switching systems containing typically 
approximately 8000 electronic components. A prospective customer for 
a fixed price product that comprised of a number of systems which 
needed to meet an availability requirement requested the supplier to 
submit a proposal. The company maintained a quality system comprising 
all the elements of ISO 9001 and mainly offered customers off-the-
shelf systems. As such, any customer requirement was met with the 
standard package (e.g. warranty and repair conditions similar to when 
a new car or television is bought) which was covered by the company's 
internal practices. Previously, one of the authors had been involved 
with the company in a training exercise on the understanding and 
interpretation of reliability requirements but all the staff who had 
taken the course had subsequently left the company. A process had 
been put in place to record the date of delivery of new units and any 
failure and repair information on returned units. This was to provide 
information for a future availability assessment. This process had 
been running from the time of the course, approximately three years 
previously. Senior management at the company thought it was time to 
submit proposals for customers who required more costly and complex 
systems with more comprehensive specifications.  
 
Customer Requirements 
 
Customer requirements are usually detailed within a specification, a 
statement of work or contractual documents and in the case of the 
contract being considered here there was a customer requirement that 
the availability of a system should be 0.99995. This may have been 
derived as about an hour of downtime per year which would equate to 
the amount of lost revenue by the end-user per year which is the 
contractual worth for the product development phase. The customer 
required a minimum of twenty of these systems that comprised the end 
product. Each system comprises of three separate electronic units. 
This requirement equates to  for the product. There 
were no other stated reliability requirements. This is surprising 
because usually in contracts containing reliability requirements 
there are preferred guidelines or procedures on how the requirement 
should be met.   
999.099995.0 20 =
 
Initial Questions to Supplier 
 
One of the authors was contacted to carry out the work required to 
meet the requirement and initially a number of questions were asked 
by the author to determine the type of analysis to be carried out. 
 
These questions were: 
1. How many of the same or similar systems are in service use? 
2. State the operating times for each system or percentage of service 
use time these systems have been operating? 
3. How many failures have occurred in service use for these systems? 
4. Are failures classified by when in service use they happened 
(before or after two years, severity, random, systematic 
(solved/unsolved).  
5. Is the repair policy for a system in terms of full system or 
units? If a full system, then what is the time to get a system 
available again: list average and worst case times. Go to 10.  
6. Is MTBF data available for units? If no, go back to 5. 
7. List lifed units. 
8. State repair policy for non-lifed units: replace on site or return 
to factory for repair? 
9. State the time to replace units in field for non-lifed units. 
10. Carry out availability analysis. 
 
This information was collected when one of the authors went to the 
company to carry out the assessment.  
 
Methodology 
 
When carrying out any reliability study, a methodology is established 
and used so that operating conditions and engineering assumptions (of 
equipment usage, failure time distributions, environment, etc.) can 
be taken into account. If any conditions or assumptions change, then 
results may not be relevant for the proposed system. 
  
The analysis is based on available data from existing systems and 
provides an estimate of availability of the proposed product at the 
present time. There are methods of reliability and maintainability 
analysis which are based on reliability data bases and repair 
activities e.g. US MIL-HDBK-217 and US MIL-HDBK-338 section 5 but 
these are extremely labour intensive and would not have been as 
relevant as using 'live' data. The availability calculation should 
only be used to determine contractual compliance with a customer's 
availability figure for a particular part of the product life cycle. 
Actual availabilities of the proposed equipment in service use may be 
determined at a later date. The preliminary availability assessment 
presented here is in accordance with method 2 section 8.7 of A Guide 
to System Reliability and Availability (CCTA 1988) which is as 
follows:  
1. Obtain the service requirements and specifications 
2. Identify the major system components 
3. Identify the component inter-relationships 
4. Assign reliability values 
5. Identify an average downtime 
6. Calculate the expected figures 
7. Compare figures with customer's requirement and carry out 
sensitivity analysis 
8. Identify corrective action.  
 
Lifed units are treated independently since they fail at known 
tervals. However, there were no lifed units in this product. in
 
Availability Calculations 
 
There are five definitions of availability namely instantaneous, 
mission or average, asymptotic or steady state, operational and 
intrinsic. The one the authors used was the intrinsic availability 
since the others require either complex mathematics (Markov chains), 
detailed data on failure distributions or in the case of operational 
availability - waiting time, administration time and logistic time. 
The formula for the intrinsic system availability is MTTR)(MTBF MTBF S  A +=  
where MTBF is the Mean Time Between Failures for each system and MTTR 
is the Mean Time to Repair the system at first line (O'Connor 1991, 
pp120). This is the formula used to evaluate the availability of a 
system. The formula does not take into account that units may degrade 
over time and thus a period of preventive maintenance may be 
required, say at 3 monthly to yearly intervals (or on the occasion of 
a unit failure). The need for redundancy has to be compared with the 
reliability of the units within the system since if the requirement 
can be met without using redundant systems this reduces the cost of 
spare systems. Hence calculations are required for MTBF and MTTR and 
evaluation of these parameters are discussed below.  
 
The product availability calculations are the minimal cut set steady 
state availabilities assuming the time to failure and time to repair 
are exponentially distributed (Pages and Gondran, 1986). The formulae 
are the same as the application of the binomial distribution for k-
out-of-n components (systems) using the system availability as the 
probability of success. 
 
Maintainability Analysis 
 
On failure of the product, the failed system will be replaced on the 
customer site within a 24-hour period. The repair time will include 
the time taken to remove the failed system, the time to send for a 
new unfailed system, the time to install the new system and the time 
to bring the product to full operational status. There was no 
information available on the time to repair the systems, e.g. the 
fault localisation time, isolation time, disassembly time, 
interchange time, re-assembly time, alignment time (if needed) and 
checkout time. Thus the worst case MTTR is specified as the time to 
repair the system at first line level (in the hands of the customer), 
i.e. 24 hours.  
At second line, the failed system will be returned to the supplier 
for repair. 
 
Definitions of Failure and MTBF Calculations 
 
For the MTBFs of the systems in the product, the simplest and 
cheapest method of evaluating MTBF is to record the delivery dates of 
units currently in service use, determine the duty cycle (in this 
case it was assumed that each delivered unit was operating all the 
time) and record all failures but classify them according to whether 
they are applicable to the calculation of MTBF. MTBFs should be 
calculated as if the box was a mature unit in service use (i.e. there 
should be no systematic design or manufacturing failures in the 
unit). Two failures were discounted as they were failures on 
commissioning and would not re-occur. In the case of two of the units 
never having failed, there is no universally approved calculation 
possible for MTBF however the point estimate availability will be one 
as the units have never failed. Using a worst case MTBF based on a 
formula using the Chi-squared distribution for the units will provide 
worst case availability figures so a sensitivity analysis will not be 
needed since if the requirement is met with the worst case figures, 
no further analysis is needed. Also, using provided operating time 
gives an indication of how reliable a unit may be. Another reason 
that a hazard rate has been allocated to units that haven't failed is 
that unseen contingencies during future design and service use can be 
allowed for. 
 
The Chi-squared method is not recommended (Nelson 1982) but no other 
method of MTBF calculation has been found in the literature. However 
the authors have shown that if the best case availability figures are 
chosen for units 1 and 3, the same conclusion is met for the best 
configuration of systems. 
 
The following definitions are applicable for MTBF calculations for 
mature products accepted into service use. 
A failure is the inability of a system to operate and is further 
defined as follows: 
A Failure is "Any departure from the declared manufacturing drawings 
and specifications which is observed on the equipment, which is 
detrimental to the operability or performance of the product and 
which, if it occurred in service use would require unscheduled 
maintenance action to correct." (US MIL-HDBK-781) 
The occurrence of failures as defined above will be the basis for the 
estimation of Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). 
Failures are classified as being relevant or non-relevant to MTBF 
calculation according to the glossary at the end of the paper. 
 
The MTBF of each subassembly is calculated by the similar items 
method as described in MIL-HDBK-338 and failure is defined for MTBF 
purposes as a relevant failure as described below and MIL-HDBK-781 
and DEF-STAN-0041. Only one relevant failure has occurred on similar 
units to units 1, 2, and 3 in service use. The formula for MTBF of 
each subassembly is given as the operating time of the similar 
subassemblies in service use (T), (see table 1) divided by the number 
of failures (r): MTBF= rT . The hazard rate is the inverse of the MTBF. 
 
Table 1: In-service Information for Delivered Units 
 
Unit Service 
Reference 
Number in 
Service 
Operating 
Hours 
Number of 
Failures 
1 1 7 9000 0 
1 2 3 56000 0 
1 3 3 57000 0 
1 4 4 48000 0 
2 1 4 50000 0 
2 1 4 26000 0 
2 1 2 13400 1 
2 1 4 11000 0 
2 1 1 2000 0 
2 1 5 9000 0 
2 1 4 2000 0 
3 1 4 67000 0 
3 1 3 34000 0 
3 1 3 8000 0 
 
Assumptions of the Analysis 
 
The following assumptions are made regarding the availability 
analysis: 
The product is mature (i.e. all systematic manufacturing and design 
failures have been removed from the product. Hence the product is in 
the random failures in time part of the bathtub curve (O'Connor 1991) 
and the exponential distribution is appropriate for analysis. 
The units in service use are assumed to be operating 24 hours a day, 
365 days a year (supplier knowledge). Hence, the time since delivery 
in hours is the operating time. This assumption is reasonable for 
this type of equipment. 
This is a preliminary assessment based on current knowledge. The 
availabilities on award of the contract may be determined for any 
actual system by the same formulae for intrinsic availability. 
 
Configurations 
 
A number of configurations was considered to determine the best 
layout of systems to meet the availability requirement. This list is 
not exhaustive but takes into account that extra systems would 
increase product cost and are symmetrical configurations to reduce 
extra loading on specific systems. Irrespective of the hazard 
information, the more redundancy used in a configuration will provide 
the more reliable system and the more reliable configurations will be 
the ones with the least sets of a given number of redundant systems. 
The following configurations were considered: 
 
1. 20 systems with no redundant systems: 1 set of 20 systems in total 
 
2. 20 systems with one active redundant system: 1 set of 21 systems 
in total 
 
3. 20 systems with two active redundant systems: 1 set of 22 systems 
in total 
 
4. 10 systems with one active redundant system each (2 sets of 11 in 
series): 22 systems 
 
5. 10 systems with two active redundant systems each (2 sets of 12 in 
series): 24 systems 
 
6. 5 systems with one active redundant system each (4 sets of 6 in 
series): 24 systems. 
 
7. 5 systems with two active redundant systems each (4 sets of 7 in 
series): 28 systems 
 
8. 4 systems with one active redundant system each (5 sets of 5 in 
series): 25 systems. 
 
A reliability block diagram is shown for configuration 6 below.  
 
Figure 1: Reliability Block Diagram for Configuration 6 
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The availability calculation is based on given a unit (1, 2 or 3 
within a system) has failed, then the system is taken off line and 
repaired. For the configuration containing 24 operating systems split 
into four sets in series of 6 systems in a 5 from 6 redundant 
configuration, the 5 from 6 redundant configuration means that all 6 
systems are available however only 5 are required to meet the 
requirement (e.g. a 4 engine aircraft can still fly with 3 engines 
operational). 
 
The hazard rate of a system is calculated as the sum of the hazard 
rates of units 1, 2 and 3, (see table 2). When no failure had 
occurred on a unit, the hazard rate was calculated as 
T2
2
2%,50χ where T 
is the operating time for a unit and  can be taken from 
statistical tables, (e.g. Murdoch and Barnes 1988).  
2
2%,50χ
 
Table 2: Reliability Data for System Availability Calculation 
 
 Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 System  Availability  SA
Total Hours 170000 113400 109000   
Number of 
Failures  
0 1 0   
4.076 8.818 6.358 19.252 0.9995381 Hazard rate in 
failures per 
million hours 
  
The availability of the product with configuration number 6 is given 
by the formula . This is the availability of 
six systems operating continuously or five from the six systems 
operating continuously with one of the six failed. On inputting the 
hazard rates above into the equation, the product availability is 
0.9999872. 
456
6 ))1(6( SSSP AAAA −+=
 
The equations for the product availabilities for each configuration 
are as follows: 
 
1. 20 systems with no redundant system: 20 systems in total -
  9908034.0201 == SP AA
 
2. 20 systems with one redundant system: 21 systems in total - 
 999950.0)1(21 20212 =−+= SSSP AAAA
 
3. 20 systems with two redundant systems: 22 systems in total - 
  9999998.0)1(231)1(22 22021223 =−+−+= SSSSSP AAAAAA
 
 
4. 10 systems with one redundant system each (2 sets of 11 in 
series): 22 systems -  
 
9999766.0))1(11( 210114 =−+= SSSP AAAA
 
5. 10 systems with two redundant systems each (2 sets of 12 in 
series): 24 systems -  
 
9999999.0))1(66)1(12( 221011125 =−+−+= SSSSSP AAAAAA
 
6. 5 systems with one redundant system each (4 sets of 6 in series): 
24 systems -   9999872.0))1(6( 4566 =−+= SSSP AAAA
 
 
7. 5 systems with two redundant systems each (4 sets of 7 in series): 
28 systems -  9999999.0))1(21)1(7( 425677 =−+−+= SSSSSP AAAAAA
 
 
8. 4 systems with one redundant system each (5 sets of 5 in series): 
25 systems -  9999893.0))1(5( 5458 =−+= SSSP AAAA
 
Comparison with Requirement and Feedback from the Customer 
 
The availability requirement for the product is 0.999. Thus, based on 
the above calculations, the proposed product meets the availability 
requirement for every configuration with a redundant system. The 
cheapest configuration to produce is configuration 2 with 21 systems.  
 
The results were sent to the customer with a list of recommendations. 
The customer replied stating "What happens if a front line system 
(for which spares are held at site and subject to a short term 
replacement time-scale) fails and the spare system is used then 
immediately a second failure occurs for which there is no replacement 
unit." Looking at each configuration, the only ones to meet this 
further requirement are the configurations with two extra redundant 
systems i.e. configurations 3, 5 and 7. Each of these requires 22, 24 
or 28 systems to be manufactured respectively. Now since these 
systems are highly reliable, the chance of a second failure on the 
same day must be quite small. This can be evaluated for the one 
redundant system configurations. 
 
An assumption of this analysis as that the configuration will be 
periodically maintained at yearly intervals This is a reasonable 
assumption as electronics is inherently reliable and requires little 
periodic maintenance. 
  
The probability of the configuration failing during operation within 
the period of maintenance (one year) = 
 
The probability that the configuration is available * the probability 
of the configuration failing within one year = 
 
The availability of the configuration * The probability of at least 
one block within the configuration fails =  where  ))1(1( NBP PA −−
PA  is the availability of a particular configuration,  
BP  is the probability a block fails = the probability of one system 
failure within one year and at least one system failure in the same 
redundant block within the period of repair (24 hours) or at least 
two failures in any block within the period of repair, and 
N  is the number of blocks in a configuration. 
 
To evaluate , the following are required. BP
 
The probability of one system failure within one year = 
 where 11 )1()( −−− − MTT TeTeM λλ λλ M is the number of systems in a block 
and  is one year (8760 hours). T
 
The probability of at least one system failure in the same redundant 
block within one day =  where  is 24 hours. 1)1(1 −−−− Mtte λλ t
 
The probability of at least two failures in any block within the 
period of repair = . 1)1()1(1 −−−− −−−− MttMt teteMte λλλ λλλ
 
Thus, = 
 
BP
))1()1(1())1(1()1()( 1111 −−−−−−−−− −−−−+−−− MttMtMtMTT teteMteteTeTeM λλλλλλ λλλλλλ
Using these formulae, the probability of the configuration 2 failing 
during operation within the period of maintenance = . 310*38.1 −
 
The probability of the configuration 4 failing during operation 
within the period of maintenance = . 310*98.2 −
 
The probability of the configuration 6 failing during operation 
within the period of maintenance = . 310*85.2 −
 
The probability of the configuration 8 failing during operation 
within the period of maintenance = . 310*49.2 −
 
These figures are comparable with the risk of a disastrous flood in 
London or the chance of an aircraft crash in the UK killing more than 
500 people (both  (HMSO 1988)). If an unlikely event happens, 
Boeing, for example, direct their suppliers to come up with a list of 
recommendations and the most cost effective are implemented. 
310*0.1 −
 
In the case of the customer's product requirement, costs of extra 
system manufacture should be balanced up with the risks of downtime. 
In the author's opinion configuration number 2 still provides the 
best option since the risk of a second failure is so small.  
 
It is assumed that the systems are in active redundancy or standby 
redundancy with perfect switching (another reason for using worst 
case values is that certain components of the system may have been 
left out of the analysis, e.g. cabling, switches, etc). For more than 
two systems failing in a given day, then the authors think that there 
may be some dependency of failures, e.g. common cause failures (such 
as common vibration) or common mode failures (such as changeover 
systems to activate standby redundant systems or maintenance actions 
which are common to all failure paths). This may require further work 
 the supplier on design and maintenance procedures. by
 
So far as meeting any availability requirement on award of the 
contract, the supplier should have procedures for failure reporting 
and classification and recording of the operating time and actual 
repair time accumulated. Failures occurring over a short time period 
would have to be analysed for possible dependencies and whether they 
should be discounted from the analysis. From an operational point of 
view, a Service Record Review may be run periodically to consider the 
ongoing operation of the delivered units, failures encountered and 
possible recommendations. However, given the ground benign 
environment and the performance history of the units so far, there 
will probably not be much to report. 
 
However, depending on the type of failure, the availability 
requirement may still be met since the failure(s) may be out of the 
supplier's control e.g. vandalism, voltage transient. Responsibility 
for the failure types may need clarifying with the customer to see 
who takes the responsibility and hence the possible repair cost. The 
availability figure would not include these discounted failures and 
repair time in the analysis if they were not the supplier's 
responsibility and so even though the system is unavailable, the 
availability requirement is still met.  
The supplier will need to look at the types of failure which may 
occur if there is a system failure on demand. Based on the field data 
for the availability analysis, there were two discounted failures on 
commissioning however there have been no failures on demand. This is 
why the availability analysis is applicable to both active and 
standby systems because the observed reliability on demand based on 
the supplier's data is one. 
 
Recommendations for the Supplier 
 
Since the customer does not specify how to meet the requirement; does 
not require the supplier to implement any methods which would make 
the system more reliable (e.g. FMEA, reliability growth programme, 
burn-in, design reviews, FTA, use of preventive maintenance, design 
life, etc.) and does not specify any contractual clauses for not 
meeting the requirements (e.g limited liability, reliability 
improvement warranty, penalty costs, etc), then there is no financial 
justification to the supplier for introducing more redundancy than 
necessary. 
 
Some other recommendations are as follows.  
 
A procedure is required to address the flow of uniquely specified 
information and responses to and from customers from and to the 
relevant personnel. 
  
There is a problem if the redundant system is on standby and fails 
before an operating system since it won't be detected until it is 
needed. Hence the supplier requires more information on failures on 
demand (perhaps from factory data) and looking at preventatively 
maintaining and/or periodically testing the standby system. 
 
To address problems with commissioning, the system should be run in 
before delivery with switch ons/offs as part of the test. 
 
Also, critical components that may fail at switch on should be 
determined by FMEA and the supplier should feed back any reliability 
requirements to the specific subcontractor for these components. 
 
Run a failure review board with designers/production/quality 
personnel to consider other preventive actions. 
 
Finally, as the authors have shown, the initial availability 
requirement is met with any of the redundant configurations, but 
there is a larger risk associated with using the configurations with 
only one redundant system. 
 
Conclusions 
 
An availability requirement specified in a commercial contract has 
been considered and analysed. Customer reliability requirements in 
general are specified so that suppliers will see that these aspects 
are important to the customer. Typical reliability requirements are 
backed up by appropriate design analyses so that products can be 
improved at the design stage. Unfortunately most SMEs are not 
equipped with the personnel or resources to carry out detailed 
reliability analyses such as the above and generally do not cost 
their implications into their product schedules. Consultants, when 
they are used, carry out the tasks to meet the requirements but the 
changes to the processes, product and management structure must come 
from the supplier company's senior management.  
 
Reliability requirements for commercial products are not well used or 
understood and for benign electronic products perhaps even irrelevant 
due to their inherent high reliability anyway. Requirements should 
provide a financial sting to suppliers (e.g. a reliability warranty 
clause) who do not use their quality management systems effectively 
and an incentive to create reliable and safe designs. Thus, 
reliability tools and techniques should be tailored to suit the cost 
constraints that commercial suppliers have to work under and be 
simple enough to be understood by not only the everyday reliability 
practitioner but also the quality engineer or manager who 
occasionally comes across a customer reliability specification. In 
the case of the analysis above, it is simply an application of the 
binomial distribution and probability theory using the availability 
as the probability and should be found in any standard reliability 
textbook for engineers, but it isn't. In fact, the theory has been 
taken from a textbook which is extremely high level and would put off 
most engineers who would want to carry out the analysis. Bendell, 
Disney and McCollin (1999) and discussants Quigley and Walls from the 
same paper advocate the use of simple analyses as 'complex models 
generate ambiguity and are misleading to design makers' (Quigley). 
 
The authors' wish is that as statistical reliability requirements 
appear in more commercial contracts, that research is carried out on 
making reliability techniques less cumbersome, less costly and more 
user friendly so that SMEs can use them to improve their products at 
the design stage.     
 
The authors' thanks are extended to the referee for his comments on 
some of the equations and to Mr Peter Dixon for his help in dealing 
with them. 
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Glossary  
 
These definitions have been expanded from the basic definitions in 
MIL-HDBK-781A and DEF-STAN-0041 and have been used in various 
aerospace contracts. 
  
Non-relevant Failure: A failure which if it occurred in service would 
be confirmed at the point of use but would not be detrimental to the 
operability or performance of the equipment but would require 
unscheduled first line maintenance action. 
 
Fault: A failure not detected during normal operation, but may be 
detected at maintenance levels other than first line, usually 
unrelated to the primary cause of subassembly replacement. 
 
A list of relevant failures are defined below: 
Premature wear-out: A failure of an item with a specified life 
expectancy, when operated within the defined replacement time of that 
item. 
Part design: A failure due to the inadequate design of a part. 
Part assembly: a failure due to the inadequate manufacture of a part. 
Equipment design: a failure due to inadequate design of the 
equipment. 
Equipment assembly: a failure due to inadequate assembly of the 
equipment. 
Unconfirmed random: a failure which cannot be duplicated or is still 
under investigation or for which no cause can be determined. 
Unconfirmed random: The first occurrence of a failure for a limited 
period of time, followed by the item's recovery to perform within 
specified limits without remedial action. Subsequent occurrences of 
the same intermittency on the same equipment shall be considered non-
relevant. 
 
A list of non-relevant failures as defined above is given below. 
Associated failure: a failure that was not the cause of the equipment 
to fail. 
Acceptable wear-out: a failure of an item with a specified life 
expectancy, when operated beyond the defined replacement time of that 
item. 
Acceptable damage: a failure caused by an accident. 
Adjustment: a failure corrected by acceptable types of operator or 
installation adjustment or other maintenance. 
No fault found: a failure unconfirmed by investigation. 
Documentation: a failure due to an incorrect piece of paperwork, e.g. 
a drawing, a part specification, an operating, maintenance or repair 
procedure. 
Consequential: a failure resulting directly or indirectly from the 
failure of another item. 
 
